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Making sense of N/nonsense in
Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds





1 The issue of mapping parameters of meaning can be broached from two different angles
and at different levels. In texts and discourse, parameters of meaning can be described as
microlinguistic structures or as larger discursive units. My analysis focuses on textual
meaning, which implies broadening parameters to encompass pragmatic criteria such as
illocutionary intention, text-cohesion, situational context and inter-subjective relations.
2 They can also be tackled negatively, i.e. by examining parameters of the elaboration of
nonsense. Understanding what opposes meaning to its opposite would then enable us to
circumscribe it. The notion of limit is essential here, all the more so as it is often blurred
and elusive: as we will see, it is often hard to establish a clear-cut distinction between
sense and nonsense.
3 The theoretical framework for my analyses of meaning elaboration will be pragmatics,
taking into account the notions of speech acts and Gricean cooperation. My starting point
will be the so-called “early Wittgenstein” and his claim in the Tractatus that meaning can
only be defined from the inside as ‘what can be said’. It is impossible, for Wittgenstein, to
try and define meaning from a meta-physical  point of  view, since we would then be
outside of it, and we would not make sense. This leads him to his famous claim that ‘what
we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence’ (§ 7). What strikes me in this logic is
that  it  necessarily excludes nonsense precisely as  what  cannot be circumscribed and
cannot be talked about. How then can we attempt a linguistic reflection and positive
Making sense of N/nonsense in Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds and The Third...
Corela, HS-10 | 2012
1
configuration of the phenomenon itself, other than by dismissing nonsense as mere non-
sense (whatever lies outside of the realm of sense)? 
4 My aim here is to map out instances of what we usually call nonsensical discourse, by
focusing on examples considered as both purposeful and positively creative, rather than
mere failures of sense. Such instances show that nonsense can only be comprehended
through its  realization within a  context  of  meaningful  discourse.  It  thus  reveals  the
elasticity of meaning as much as it exposes itself as one of its extreme variations. My
corpus is therefore based on two novels by the Irish satirist Flann O’Brien (1906-1966): At
Swim-Two-Birds and The Third Policeman. Making sense of nonsense is at the heart of both
works, through a playful game of subversion of what we generally call “meaningful” and
“nonsensical”  discourses.  O’Brien  offers  a  philosophical  reflection  on  language  by
depicting his characters’ complex relationships to their specific languages, English and
Gaelic  Irish.  His  novels  and  chronicles  describe  diglossic  angst  and  the  constant
hesitations of speakers who are never quite sure when they are making sense or talking
nonsense. At the same time, O’Brien’s comic writing makes use of language games and
displays the exhilaration and poetic pleasure nonsense can create. Such games can be
traced  back  to  different  literary  traditions,  including,  but  by  no  means  limited  to,
Victorian Nonsense literature.
5 I will examine four examples in order to establish a gradation in nonsensical discourse;
this gradation brings to light the limited pragmatic parameters at work in the process of
elaborating  and understanding meaning.  It  also  reveals  their  essential  deformability.
Thus I wish to avoid reducing nonsense in literature to either a cadavre-exquis type of
discourse, or to Jabberwocky Nonsense (where I believe the official, capitalized name has
already led to limiting a very wide linguistic and literary phenomenon to a historically
narrow genre).
6 Flann O’Brien often quoted and inserted dictionary definitions in his stories, the more to
point out their faults and satirize what he regarded as their undeserved and tyrannical
authority.  It  is  only fitting,  then,  that we should start our inquiry in a typical  Flann
O’Brien fashion, with a dictionary.
7 The OED only defines “nonsense”, simply and frustratingly, as “That which is not sense;
absurd of meaningless words or ideas”. We must therefore go back to the definition of
“sense”.  According to the OED,  sense consists of  “meaningful  symbols combined in a
legitimate  manner”.  Therefore,  if  we  take  it  the  other  way  round,  nonsense  must
correspond to either symbols with no meaning content, or to symbols with legitimate
meaningful  content  but  arranged  in  a  non-legitimate  way.  The  following  examples
illustrate this definition:
(1) snarks are dangerous
(2) lion tiger stag
8 These are textbook-classic examples but do not satisfy me as typical cases of nonsense.
The first one features a word (borrowed from Lewis Carroll’s poem “The Hunting of the
Snark”) whose reference is unknown but still  highly evocative of meaning because it
belongs  to  a  known grammatical  category  (discrete  noun).  Also,  because  of  its  close
resemblance to  other  meaningful  words  such as  ‘shark’  ‘lark’  and‘snake’,  the  overall
effect  of  the sentence does not strike us as nonsensical,  but rather,  as  fictional.  The
second example (originally coined by Chomsky; quoted in Carruthers 1992) is clearly non-
grammatical, but how is the listener to know, without any context, whether this is a case
of infelicitous meaningful intention on the part of the speaker, or the result of a genuine
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endeavour to “talk nonsense”? This in turn raises the question: can we relevantly talk of
strict parameters of meaning? If there is such a thing as utter nonsense then we cannot
possibly conceptualize it.  My premise is that pure nonsense lies outside the realm of
analysis – simply because the very fact of analysis requires minimal sense in the object of
study. Or to put it in terms of possible worlds, pure nonsense would not fit in any possible
world and therefore cannot be grasped by our understanding.
9 My aim is to examine nonsense as a specific category of language use just as Victorian
Nonsense is a literary genre, bearing in mind that although they share common features,
nonsensical discourse cannot be reduced to a set of literary conventions. The examples I
have chosen are particularly representative of Flann O’Brien’s writing, and will enable us
to examine four essential features of nonsensical discourse through a gradual typology:
starting with nonsense as a subversion of conventional rules of communication, I will
then concentrate on the distortion of traditional logic, and finally examine extreme cases
of nonsensical gibberish.
 
1. Nonsense as non-cooperative discourse: pragmatic
parameters
(3) [the birth of Furriskey being the subject of the examination referred to:]
In what manner was he born?
He awoke as if from sleep.
His sensations?
Bewilderment, perplexity.
Are not these terms synonymous and one as a consequence redundant?
Yes: but the terms of the inquiry postulated unsingular information.
(…)
Describe this man’s conduct after he had examined his face.
He arose from his bed and examined his stomach, lower chest and legs.
What parts did he not examine?
His back, neck and head.
Can you suggest a reason for so imperfect a survey?
Yes. His vision was necessarily limited by the movements of his neck.
(Flann O’Brien, At Swim-Two-Birds [1939], 1967, London, Penguin, p. 42)
10 The nonsensical  dimension in this comic scene is the absurd succession of irrelevant
questions and answers within the same text unit. However, the textual context of this
excerpt enables us to outline a number of criteria highlighting how sense and nonsense
interact here.
11 At Swim-Two-Birds is O’Brien’s first novel, and was hailed as a comic masterpiece by Joyce
himself (Cronin 1998). The comedy mostly relies on puns, nonsensical jokes and absurd
situations, as well as a series of embedded narratives, which have earned the book its
epithet of post-modern from many critics (Hopper 1995). The novel features an unnamed
first-person narrator who lives with his uncle and studies at University College Dublin but
spends most of his time in bed, writing a novel about Trellis, a tyrannical author who
writes stories and so on and so forth. Passages from the main storyline alternate with so-
called excerpts from the narrator’s novel, as is the case in the example above.
12 Our first example is a nonsensical trial; it takes place in a dream. Trellis, the fictional
author, is tried by his own characters, then found guilty (of exploitation and cruelty) and
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sentenced to a horrible death. Furriskey is Trellis’ fictional son, a character Trellis gave
birth to through ‘aesthogamy’.
13 Here the very setting calls to mind the tradition of Victorian Nonsense – nonsensical trial
being a trope of the genre. Jean-Jacques Lecercle has analysed nonsensical trials in Lewis
Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland. He defines nonsensical discourse based on four main criteria
(Lecercle 1995):
• the dialectical opposition between excess of structure and lack of logic,
• the metalinguistic dimension of discourse
• nonsense reveals the literary text as fiction
• the ambiguous relationship between dream and reality.
14 In our excerpt, Trellis (the respondent) betrays a form of excess in his use of synonyms to
answer a simple question. As his judge remarks, synonyms saturate the paradigmatic axis
of  the utterance and thus paradoxically,  deplete  its  meaning.  The repetition itself  is
nonsensical  because  it  effectively  voids  the  utterance  of  its  strength.  Nonsensical
repetition is also to be found in the list of body parts at the end of the scene. For Lecercle,
nonsense relies on the exhaustion of lists and series. Similarly, the nonsensical logic of
series means that speakers exhaust the list of possible questions, regardless of any form
of pragmatic relevance; in this case, the last two questions are obviously unnecessary
since the non-examined parts of the body are clearly those left out of the previous list of
examined parts. Trellis answers consistently with this nonsensical logic of series, since he
responds literally to all  the questions,  thus flouting the Gricean rules of  clarity,  and
quantity, and overall relevance (Grice 1975).
15 The first consequence of the nonsensical list is that it reveals its own commentary on
language itself. Here the trial is at the same time a trial of language; language is at fault
when Trellis  is  made to give a  redundant  answer because the “terms of  the inquiry
postulated  unsingular  information”.  The  metalinguistic  comment  on  language  is
therefore necessarily embedded in the nonsensical trial dialogue. 
16 A second consequence directly derived from this is the meta-fictive dimension of the text,
which is made explicit by the underlying narrative irony throughout the text.
17 Finally, the confusion between dream and reality is the very backdrop to the scene: the
rebellious characters have drugged their master and take advantage of the fact that he is
asleep to carry out their coup. Trellis becomes his characters’ hostage in his own dream.
Trellis’ description of Furriskey’s birth as ‘waking as if from sleep’ further echoes the
confusion between reality and dream throughout the book.
18 We can now draw a first set of conclusions. First, as we have seen, this dialogue fits the
definition of Victorian Nonsense as laid out by Jean-Jacques Lecercle, both structurally
and in its goal: it is first and foremost a kind of metalinguistic discourse. Bearing this in
mind, we can now go back to Wittgenstein who states in his early philosophy that any
‘meta-’ or reflexive discourse is necessarily nonsensical, because to be able to speak about
the  meaning  of  language  (as  the  object  of  our  discourse),  we  would  have  to  locate
ourselves outside meaning, in a realm of non-sense. However, I believe that much more
than being nonsensical,  meta-discourse in fact accurately reveals the inner opacity of
language itself. It suggests that nonsense is a constitutive part of language and that it
needs  to  be  construed  as  another  variable  inherent  to  the  process  of  meaningful
utterances, making us realise that there is no clear-cut distinction between sense and
nonsense.
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19 Nevertheless, we cannot be content with this example as a typical instance of nonsense:
we (the reader, the narrator and the characters taking part in the dialogue) understand
what happens in this scene very clearly, and this is what makes O’Brien’s comic writing
successful here. From a pragmatics point of view, what we have analysed is a set of rules
for  a  type  of  discourse.  Considering  the  pragmatic  interaction  between  speakers  in
dialogue (1), and bearing in mind Grice’s maxims of cooperative communication (Grice
1975), we can now say that the rules of nonsensical discourse roughly overlap with those
of non-cooperation (refusal to be informative, clear, relevant, and truthful). This is where
the problem eludes us: the principles of non-cooperation are in fact equally essentialist as
those of cooperative, meaningful communication. Hence Nonsense as a literary genre,
though  based  on  transgression  of  meaning  and  cooperation,  posits  the  very  same
principles as those which it seeks to subvert. Example one thus shows that nonsense can
be traced within sense itself,  as  an extreme variable in the pragmatic parameters of
cooperative conversation, and as a dynamic force which playfully distorts and unsettles
our received conception of meaning.
 
2. Nonsense and truth-value: parameters of logic
(4) If a man stands before a mirror and sees in it his reflection, what he sees is not a
true reproduction of himself but a picture of himself when he was a younger man.
De Selby’s explanation of this phenomenon is quite simple. Light, as he points out
truly  enough,  has  an  ascertained  and  finite  rate  of  travel.  Hence  before  the
reflection of any object in a mirror can be said to be accomplished, it is necessary
that rays of light should first strike the object and subsequently impinge on the
glass, to be thrown back again to the object – to the eyes of a man, for instance.
There  is  therefore  an  appreciable  and  calculable  interval  of  time  between  the
throwing by a man of a glance at his own face in a mirror and the registration of the
reflected image in his eye.
(The Third Policeman [1940&1967] 2001, London, Flamingo, pp. 68-69).
20 The Third Policeman, O’Brien’s second novel, is for the most part a satire of philosophers
and scientists. It targets both the logic and authority of scientific discourse, and the ‘new
physics’ of his time – quantum physics and the law of relativity. True to the genre of
Nonsense,  this  passage depicts  the same dialectic of excess  and loss,  contrasting the
lengthy and exhaustive  reasoning of  De Selby with his  complete  disconnection from
reality. More specifically, this example presents us with a piece of nonsensical scientific
reasoning.
21 I previously mentioned the OED definition of a nonsensical utterance as one which either
lacks  meaning or  does  not  present  a  legitimate grammatical  structure.  In De Selby’s
discourse, premise and logical reasoning function as meaning and grammar. Everything is
fine until De Selby brings in the concept of logical necessity: “it is necessary that rays of
light  should  first  strike  (...)”.  This  sentence  presents  a  double  modality,  with  the
extraposed clausal subject emphasizing the modality of logical necessity, and with the
further insistence of the modal should. It seems as if De Selby protests too much here: why
not simply use must to express logical necessity? His insistence on necessity comically
betrays the fact that De Selby is not only mistaken, but also that he has no idea what he is
talking about.
22 Besides the polyphonic dimension of the text (the whole explanation is presented with
ironic distance by the first person narrator), De Selby’s logic is defective on two accounts:
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first,  his  reasoning  is  entirely  made up from the  conclusion;  in  the  text,  De  Selby’s
conclusion is at the beginning and serves as his premise. Secondly, De Selby mistakes
quantifiable for visible, thus blowing up the infinitely small into humongous proportions.
De Selby follows through with his logic further on in the scene, declaring that with a very
big glass and a system of embedded mirrors, he can see himself at birth.
23 We call this piece of reasoning nonsense because De Selby has inverted the function of
language as  a  tool  for  describing reality. Instead of  using facts  of  the  real  world as
evidence to keep his imaginative reasoning in check, De Selby makes the world fit his
meandering logic. The Searlian “word-to-world fit” metaphor (Searle 1985) brings us back
to  the  problem  of  referenciality  (or  lack  thereof)  as  a  criterion  for  meaningful  or
nonsensical utterance.
24 But is this really a case of nonsense? Wittgenstein and analytic philosophers would say,
rather,  that  De Selby’s  is  just  a  series  of  false  propositions.  Again,  this  is  not  really
nonsense:  we  understand  perfectly  what  De  Selby  means:  his  propositions  refer  to
something but they happen to be false because they do not correspond to facts in the real
world. De Selby’s theory is not fiction either (although highly imaginative), for lack of a
specific intention to that effect. We call his theory nonsense because he is wrong both
about the world and about how language refers to the world. I wish to point out here that
the notion of truth-value, according to Wittgenstein, does not enter in the determination
of nonsense v. sense. As he explains in the Tractatus, nonsense is neither true nor false:
just like positive and negative numbers, there is a reality that is the case and a reality that
is not the case – but it is not relevant to nonsense itself.  This means that De Selby’s
distorted perception of  reality  still  lies  within the  realm of  sense.  What  we initially
recognized as nonsensical elements in De Selby’s reasoning is thus in fact an essential
part of the fabric of meaning itself.
 
3. Nonsense and glossolalia: unexplainable utterances
(5) The ‘Codex’ (…) is a collection of some two thousand sheets of foolscap closely
hand-written on both sides. The signal distinction of the manuscript is that not one
word  of  the  writing  is  legible.  Attempts  made  by  different  commentators  to
decipher  certain  passages  which  look  less  formidable  than  others  have  been
characterized  by  fantastic  divergences,  not  in  the  meaning  of  the  passages  (of
which there is no question) but in the brand of nonsense which is evolved. One
passage, described by Bassett as being ‘a penetrating treatise on old age’ is referred
to by Henderson (biographer of Basset) as‘a not unbeautiful description of lambing
operations on an unspecified farm’. Such disagreement, it must be confessed, does
little to enhance the reputation of either writer.
(The Third Policeman, p. 163)
25 In this example, De Selby’s readers and critics are faced with an illegible manuscript –
literally. The impossibility to make sense of the ‘Codex’ leaves us with two hypotheses:
either the writing is in fact, legitimate– and nonsense simply reflects an incapacity on the
part of the reader, or the manuscript itself is an elaborate joke presenting us with mock
writing,  something  that  resembles  writing  but  is  not  –  a  written  equivalent  of  the
utterance of random sounds to imitate language.
26 O’Brien’s description of the Codex here is one of the highlights of his comic prose, but it
may also be inspired by a real document: the Voynich Code, an entirely undecipherable 15
thcentury manuscript, which has baffled researchers and code-breakers for decades. The
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manuscript,  which was first  revealed to  the public  by its  owner,  antiquarian Wilfrid
Voynich, at a 1921 conference in Philadelphia (see Gawsewitch 2005), may well have been
known to Flann O’Brien by the time he wrote The Third Policeman in 1940. Whether or not
this is the case, the range and variety of interpretations that have been suggested for the
Voynich Manuscript strikingly resemble O’Brien’s comic description here – from a secret
cypher by the philosopher Roger Bacon to a liturgical manual of Catharism, to a hoax
(Gawsewitch 2005). All attempts have presupposed meaningful intentions on the part of
the anonymous writer, just as O’Brien’s fictional commentators try to make sense of the
Codex. Here, nonsense seems to carry strong pragmatic significance, as it both protects
and signals the existence of a secret meaning to be uncovered.
27 Finally, De Selby’s Codex can also be linked to a written form of what is generally known
as glossolalia,  also known as “speaking in tongues”.  William John Samarin defines the
phenomenon as “a meaningless but phonologically structured human utterance believed
by the speaker  to  be  a  real  language but  bearing no systematic resemblance to  any
natural language, living or dead” (Samarin 1972: 2). Although such phenomenon often
occurs  as  a  “kind  of  automatic  behavior  or  as  a  feature  of  an  altered  state  of
consciousness”  (1972:22),  glossolalia  is  not  always  dependent  on  trance.  Samarin’s
conclusion is almost Wittgensteinian in tone, and brings us back to the intrinsic link
between sense and nonsense, to our inability to understand one without the other and to
the blurred distinction between them: “what I hear is nonsense; the sounds make no sense
to me. But I know that what lies beyond is what counts, and that is sacred ground” (1972:
236).
28 Our example operates at two different narrative levels. At the level of the story itself, the
Codex is either a hoax or a piece of mindless scribble; put together with the seriousness of
the commentators, it creates ironical contrast and serves O’Brien’s comic prose as well as
his social satire of philosophers, scientists and academics. O’Brien’s criticism meets that
of the early Wittgenstein, when he suggests that philosophers delude themselves and
others into thinking they are making sense when really, they only create nonsense by
talking about “that which cannot be talked about” (Tractatus, §7).
29 From  a  more  philosophical  point  of  view,  the  Codex  episode  offers  us  a  humorous
commentary on language as a pragmatic game. There is a shift here: the scene tells us as
much  about  sense  and  nonsense  as  it  does  about  social  behaviour.  What  remains
meaningful in this nonsensical manuscript is its phatic dimension, as if its sole intention
was to establish a contact with the audience (i.e. its readers). It is also a game of make-
believe as an imitation of meaningful communicative behaviour. Again, the pragmatic
criterion takes pride of place, in the sense that what is left here is an inter-subjective
relation between speakers, regardless of the nature of its linguistic content.
30 This brings us back to the meta-linguistic dimension of all our examples so far; all such
examples  can  be  made  sense  of,  and  we  are  never  short  of  applying  meaningful
interpretations  to  what  seems at  first  like  nonsense.  As  the  Wittgenstein hypothesis
reminds us, we can never completely step outside of meaning. Flann O’Brien’s nonsensical
games put forward his intuitions on the natural ambiguity and opacity of language, and
its essentially social and pragmatic dimension. 
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Conclusion
(6)  Le  Fournier  (…)  suggests  that  de  Selby,  when writing  the  Album,  paused to
consider  some  point  of  difficulty  and  in  the  meantime  engaged  in  the  absent-
minded practice known generally as ‘doodling’, then putting the manuscript away.
The  next  time  he  took  it  up  he  was  confronted  with  a  mass  of  diagrams  and
drawings which he took to be the plans of a type of dwelling he always had in mind
and immediately wrote many pages explaining the sketches.
(The Third Policeman, p. 19)
31 This final example shows how elusive nonsense is (is ‘doodling’ a case of nonsense?), since
every effort at analysis and explanation provides meaning even where there was not even
a communicative intention in the first place. Thus nonsense is what we cannot talk about,
since  by  giving  it  meaning,  we  change  it  into  something  else.  In  the  Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein states that all meta-discourse is a form of nonsense. He discards ethics and
metaphysics as a waste of time; this implies however, that the Tractatus itself, being a
philosophical treatise, and thus a piece of meta-discourse, belongs de facto to the same
category... which Wittgenstein seems to acknowledge in his conclusion:
§ 6.54. My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally
recognizes them as senseless,  when he has climbed out through them, on them,
over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on
it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
§ 7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
32 While  Wittgenstein  and  the  so-called  ‘linguistic  turn’  of  his  time  influenced  Flann
O’Brien’s  satire  and his  reflections  on  sense  and nonsense  (Coulouma 2007),  O’Brien
deliberately  took  the  opposite  approach  to  Wittgenstein’s  injunctions  by  making
reflexive, meta-linguistic speculation his prime method for representing the complexities
and ambiguities of sense. Something remains, however, of the Wittgensteinian method in
O’Brien’s  play  on  sense  and  nonsense:  the  opposition  between  saying  and  showing,
between the realm of sense and that of the inexpressible, where elusive nonsense lies.
Bearing that in mind, we can say that nonsense shows itself in our examples, beyond
language-mediated explanation and description, as what remains unexplained once we
have made sense of everything else.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper examines the question of nonsense through a series of examples taken from Flann
O’Brien’s satirical novels. Starting from Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus that any reflexive
discourse on language is itself nonsensical and that nonsense lies outside the realm of what can
be talked about, this paper establishes a gradual typology of nonsensical discourse. Its aim is to
try and delineate the linguistic and pragmatic parameters separating sense from nonsense in
language, and thus propose a redefinition of nonsense.
Cet article propose une analyse du non-sens à travers quatre extraits de deux romans satiriques
de Flann O’Brien, et en regard de la théorie Wittgensteinienne du Tractatus selon laquelle tout
discours réflexif sur le langage (sensé ou non) est lui-même du non-sens. La typologie proposée
ici  permet  d’isoler  des  paramètres  linguistiques  et  pragmatiques  communs  à  différentes
occurrences de discours nonsensique, afin de déterminer la distinction entre sens et non-sens
dans le langage, et de parvenir à une redéfinition du non-sens.
INDEX
Mots-clés: non-sens, jeux de langage, métalangue, Flann O’Brien, Wittgenstein
Keywords: nonsense, language games, meta-linguistic discourse, Flann O’Brien, Wittgenstein
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